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Reasoning by analogy is man’s most
favored and least trusted logical tool. With-
out it he would be seriously hampered in
his search for explanations of human be-
havior, yet with it he has committed some
of his most noteworthy scientific blunders.
The perils of reasoning by analogy have
been catalogued with such devastating care
in the education of most thinkers that they
have had to choose from among three alter-
natives if they are loath to abandon this
fascinating form of logic. First, they can
continue the practice of this arcane art in
the privacy of their own minds and display
the outcome of such thought to the public
while maintaining strict secrecy regarding
the process by which it was achieved. Sec-
ond, they can boldly display their predilec-
tion and admit their addiction to all forms
of analogy but render their activity harmless
by erecting a series of &dquo;warning&dquo; or &dquo;caution&dquo;
signs for the reader. As an excuse for their
psychological quirk, they may lean on ra-
tionalizations similar to those once popular
as an explanation for the heavy consumption
of whiskey, i.e., for medicinal purposes,
snake bite, etc. Finally, the scientist may,
rather than call a spade a spade, call an
analogy a model. Such a maneuver is a
testament to scientific ingenuity for it simul-
taneously gives prestige to the process while
leaving its essence unchanged.
This account of personal hostility and
international aggression is not intended as
an exercise in analysis by analogy or model
building. Rather, it will describe the vicissi-
tudes of threat, aggression, and deterrence
among children who hate. The extrapolation
from personal hostility to the paradoxes of
international aggression can be stimulating
and provocative if we are the masters rather
than the victims of reasoning by analogy.
An analogy is, like any instrument, not
dangerous in itself; its hazard lies in the
way it is used. Analogy has a long and
noble history of fomenting new vistas of
thought and new combinations of ideas. Its
successful application requires only restraint
and avoidance of excess.
Living with a group of 70 aggressive, anti-
social, anti-adult boys provides, in miniature,
an unparalleled opportunity to experiment
with the natural history of aggression and its
deterrence. The setting for these observa-
tions was The University of Michigan Fresh
Air Camp. The camp is a clinical training
center for graduate students drawn from the
fields of clinical psychology, psychiatric
nursing, psychiatric social work, and special
education; the campers are boys recruited
from detention homes, training schools,
mental hospitals, and clinics throughout the
State of Michigan. The camp specializes in
children who hate. Since it is a diagnostic
and therapeutic training center (3) there is
an &dquo;unnatural&dquo; element to the interaction of
these aggressive children; their most violent
and gross expressions of hostility are ob-
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structed by the adults for reasons of common
humanity. In almost all other respects (ex-
cept for physical punishment) the camp
duplicates the normal life-setting of the
child who is in violent protest against the
form society has taken, the demands it
makes on him, and the forces who represent
the present world order. The camp, then, is
an arena in which each child acts out his
destructive pathology in relating to himself,
his peers, and the rules of peaceful living.
The Communication of Threat
At the beginning of the camp season, our
angry young men are usually strangers to
one another. While each has a long record
of war-like proclivities, he has only a dim
awareness of the details of the hostile en-
counters of the other boys. Each boy has
organized his perception of the world and
his position in it along the dimension of
toughness, fierceness, fearlessness, and resist-
ance to the influence of others. It is these
ingredients that come to flavor the social
mixture which shortly emerges. At once, the
boys begin a pattern of militant probing of
one another in their individual and group
relations seeking to establish a basis for
dominance and submission.
The camp aggressive pecking order is
established by the boys through a number
of interpersonal devices which resemble
those used by nations to establish their posi-
tion in the world. A description of some of
the most prominent devices and brief case
illustrations of their use will be presented
here but no reliable objective data are
available. The generalizations which make
up the substance of the analogy are derived
from observations of patterns of delinquent
aggression at the camp for the last six years.
In this respect, the conclusions reached
should be treated as theoretical speculations
based on clinical experience. The regularity
of the appearance of these aggressive se-
quences makes the nature of our summer
experience highly predictable but statistical
estimates of the frequency of appearance of
each of the devices or of the frequency of
various responses to our attempts to deter
aggression must await the execution of a
systematic experiment now in the planning
stage.
SABER RATTLING
Most often, sabers are rattled on a to-
whom-it-may-concern basis. Tall tales of
aggressive prowess, violation of the law, de-
fiance of adults, and resistance to requests
all communicate threat to the eager listeners.
They constitute a declaration of readiness to
act violently as well as a demonstration of
fearlessness. As soon as some recognizable
order begins to emerge in the group, the
saber-rattling becomes increasingly target-
oriented and these subtle communications
of threat focus on that person perceived as
most powerful. The art of saber-rattling is
practiced with great finesse by these boys,
and they are careful to make their threats
ambiguous and not easily challenged. At
this stage in their relations with others they
cannot afford, nor do they intend, to have
a showdown. They rather are seeking to
detect saber-rattling-induced-fear in others.
This device is the least expensive and least
dangerous form of establishing dominance
over others. It is also, by its very ambiguity,
the least effective. Its most usual conse-
quence is heightened saber-rattling by the
intended victims. If at this point the threat
is reinforced by sudden, violent action, the
dominance pattern quickly crystallizes with
the advantage going to the aggressor. The
cost of an ill-timed or poorly prepared as-
sault is immense. The aggressor who fails
is pounced upon by the others and forced
to suffer further humiliation and loss in
status. Being aware that this fate awaits
the loser, saber-rattling is intense and pro-
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longed but the point of no return is carefully
avoided.
The most usual form of saber-rattling is the
threat of massive retaliation if any other boy
tampers with one’s personal possessions. This
is done before any tampering occurs. Tommy,
for example, walked into his cabin the first day,
distributed his possessions on his bed, coolly
surveyed his new cabin mates, turned to the
counselor and announced, &dquo;If anyone touches
this stuff he’s going to be minus some teeth.&dquo;
The fact that these were the first words he
uttered made his aggressiveness have greater
impact and the generalized nature of the threat
was such that no other boy felt personally
challenged. In this instance the counselor was
taken aback and erred by stating that he didn’t
think anyone would touch his property. When
the counselor failed to deal with the fact that
threatening others was improper behavior and
responded, rather, by assuring the threatener he
would not have to carry out the threat, the other
boys could only conclude that the threatener
was indeed powerful. In the first few moments
of his diplomatic contact with the other boys,
the threatener had gained an enormous advan-
tage ; an advantage that could have been limited
by a proper and well-timed response.
RECOUNTING PAST GLORIES
A refined version of the communication
of threat is to be found in the recital of glory
attained in great historical conflicts. This
device has a quality of the &dquo;Terrible Turk&dquo;
about it and is not subject to critical or ob-
jective appraisal by the listeners. To be
sure, the audience regularly discounts these
tales of heroism and power, but a lingering
doubt is planted in the mind of the con-
sumer and this doubt can grow vigorously
when nurtured by the intended victim’s
fears. The potential combatants match
story-for-story while they eye one another
warily to judge the degree of current prow-
ess that remains from this colorful history.
I have seen boys literally come to believe
their own propaganda and act hastily and
ill-advisedly while swept up in their delu-
sion of capability. As their fictions wax
more incredible, the level of threat perceived
by others increases apace and the probabil-
ity of open conflict becomes assured. Once
these tribal tales have become excessive and
when the dominance-seeker is confident of
his ground, he can force the issue simply by
announcing publicly that the other is a liar.
This grievous insult can only be revenged
by battle or backing down. Either alterna-
tive fixes another portion of the ranking of
dominance and submission. Again, the chal-
lenger has the advantage and usually elim-
inates the other as a competitive threat. A
bold course of action, particularly when it
is excessively violent, acts to inhibit similar
behavior among the observers and to force
them to soft pedal their accounts of ancient
heroism.
Harold had been sent to the detention home
(for two days) when he was caught extorting
money from younger school children. One eve-
ning he was regaling his cabin mates with stories
of a series of fierce fights he had with bigger
boys at the detention home and of how he had
used judo to best them. As the other boys
listened with fascination and asked detailed
questions, he began to elaborate in an un-
believable fashion. One other boy vied for
attention by telling similarly exaggerated tales,
each one topping the other. As the audience
became split between the two, the boys began
to accuse one another of lying and fell to fight-
ing in an attempt publicly to demonstrate their
prowess. They remained enemies for the dura-
tion of camp since each had unforgivably
wounded the other psychologically.
THE ROLE CALL OF ALLIES
Early in the process of social maneuver
the child can increase his potential threat
by making unsparing reference to his &dquo;gang&dquo;
at home or other allies who would join him
in an aggressive adventure. This role call
of allies tends to be highly unrealistic since
their capacity to deliver military support and
their willingness to become embroiled in a
purely local contest are highly speculative.
In itself, the reference to allies is an admis-
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sion of weakness that does not go unnoticed
by those exposed to such claims. Unless
some convincing demonstration of allied
solidarity is forthcoming, our aggressive
children demote the users of such a threat
to a submissive status. The usual response
of the threatener is then to redouble his
effort to frighten others with the strength
of his allies and this action serves only to
confirm the group’s original low estimate
of his capacity.
Allies prove to communicate the greatest
threat when they are obviously present,
certain to act immediately in retaliation,
capable of inflicting substantial damage, and
are not paraded out of fear. To accomplish
these ends, groups of boys consolidate their
relations with others into a gang structure
and a group code which binds them to-
gether. By institutionalizing (1) their ag-
gressive behavior and becoming interde-
pendent on one another, they increase the
risk of becoming involved in a personally
meaningless conflict but the price is always
judged well worth the benefit they receive
through the strength of unity. The forma-
tion of gangs in the camp makes the role
call of allies a more meaningful threat and
one that serves as a focus for the end-
less tug-of-war of dominance-submission re-
lationships. As the gangs come to resemble
nation-states, the quality of aggressive inter-
play shifts to a different dimension with
altered characteristics. To judge the individ-
ual’s readiness to respond with hostility you
must now account for his relationship to his
social group and the complexity of the pre-
diction increases immeasurably (1).
Few leaders are lone wolves. There is a re-
assurance in the existence of a gang and we
never encountered a child for whom the notion
of submerging individual desires to the group
good was not already a familiar idea. Tony
(one of our most accomplished delinquent
leaders) began, with the aid of a single lieu-
tenant, to form a loyal group by what now
seem to us to be a classic series of steps. Once
the broad outline of dominance and submission
had been established he forced the weakest boys
to join him or suffer punishment. At the same
time, he bribed those of middle power by shar-
ing stolen candy and cigarettes with them. Hav-
ing assembled a hard core of five boys, he
consolidated them into a loyal group by leading
forays (night raids, attacking lone younger chil-
dren, forcing adult decisions in their favor,
etc.) which made the group both disciplined and
visible to others. The remaining three boys,
who had been strong enough to resist Tony’s
leadership, soon joined the ranks with the others
since they found the array of Tony’s allies too
powerful to withstand. Tony’s visible display of
allies forced the cabin holdouts to line up with
him but it also acted to threaten neighboring
cabins whose borders he regularly trespassed.
Other gangs formed (using the argument of
mutual defense against Tony) and open warfare
soon resulted. As an interesting sidelight, those
groups formed only with the common motive of
defense suffered more internal bickering and
never developed a coherent policy of meeting
Tony’s threats and invasions.
OUR GROWING MIGHT
For both groups and individuals, threat
is apparent in communication to others
about growing prowess and might. In camp
this most frequently takes the form of de-
scription of exotic weaponry secretly avail-
able. Thus, a real or imagined switch-blade
knife that a boy implies he has available to
him is a source of considerable anxiety to
others. If he is known to be weaponless, he
can resort to claiming that, out of common
cause, others are planning to supply him
with the means of destruction. The core of
this threat is mystery and the wise propa-
gandist lets the threat spawn its twisted off-
spring in the fantasy of his victim. A knife
or other weapon is a meaningful threat since
it tends to equalize the more obvious and
observable dimensions of size, age, and
strength. In much the same fashion, psy-
chological warfare about strength is con-
ducted via the enhancement of observable
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properties. The boys spend hours practicing
boxing or muscle-building in highly public
places and they work to achieve and accom-
plish feats of ability in fields related to ag-
gressive capacity (i.e., athletics). The threat
of growing might usually spurs the intended
victims to engage in an armaments race with
the threatener. If this course is taken and
not restrained by some outside force, the
inevitable consequence is open warfare. As
each hostile child successively increases his
threat to the other, the process reaches a
point where it is intolerable to both and the
tension becomes mutually unbearable. At
this juncture, the need for relief from the
tension of threat is greater than the deter-
rence provided by fear of the consequences
of warfare and combat soon is joined.
A favorite (and regular) method of accruing
additional might for a gang is to steal table
knives from the dining room. These are sharp-
ened, surreptitiously, for a later &dquo;rumble&dquo; of un-
specified dimensions. In one such incident, a
single table knife was stolen at lunch and the
word spread so rapidly through the grapevine
that forty knives were missing after supper. We
forced a general disarmament by offering am-
nesty to all who would surrender their weapons
and we recovered all but a few. The most de-
termined of our aggessive leaders insisted they
were &dquo;clean&dquo; and kept their knives hidden.
Throughout that particular summer we were
plagued by the continual theft of knives and as
each culprit was apprehended he would insist
that he needed it for self defense since the
staff had been unable to disarm the others.
While the weapons were never used in combat,
the threat posed by their possession caused a
succession of fights and provoked extreme dis-
trust among individuals and gangs.
DETERRENCE BY ATTACK
The single most effective device for
spreading threat throughout the group is to
be found in deterrence by attack or what
might be described as the vicious example.
The usual sequence of events involves the
conscious selection, by a determinedly ag-
gressive boy, of an innocent victim who
possesses exactly the proper characteristics
and potentialities. Once selected, the vic-
tim is provoked into a hostile act (usually
over possessions) and then is soundly beaten
by the attacker. The original hostility on
the part of the victim is used by the attacker
as a guarantee of immunity from authority
and the victim’s savage defeat spreads like
wild fire through the community and acts
at once as a threat to everyone. The aggres-
sor need not repeat this demonstration again
since he has dramatically and violently es-
tablished his dominance and conveyed a
widespread threat. He then proceeds to
prey on any and all unprotected boys using
saber-rattling as his chief and highly effec-
tive weapon. The only limit on his capacity
to aggrandize against others is the aggressive
strength he had to begin with. If he is not
very powerful he will be deterred by bigger
and more powerful boys unless he converts
his victims into satellites who will fight as
he commands them. It is interesting that
satellites achieved by conquest become, be-
fore long, willing allies who share a common
sense of purpose with the aggressor. They
soon &dquo;forget&dquo; the basis of their association
with the aggressor and as they share the
benefits of association with him, become
convinced they are partners rather than
prisoners. Attempts to explain the true na-
ture of their relationship to the aggressor
fail to dissuade unless the benefits of disso-
ciation are made as attractive as those avail-
able as a satellite. The satellizing person,
whatever his original motivation, tends to
be actively well informed about the advan-
tages of his status and only vaguely able
to comprehend the abstract possibilities of
other arrangements. This is no accident; it
is a routine aspect of dominance-submission
relationships.
Aggressively delinquent boys rarely attack
their victims without first provoking them to
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some hostile act. Deterrence by attack is judged
in terms of the transparency of the rationaliza-
tion that is used to justify the assault. Among
boys who hunger for power, the flimsiest of
excuses is deemed sufficient and they are con-
stantly on the alert for the proper opportunity.
The most vicious illustration was the case of a
boy who hit a &dquo;friend&dquo; in the mouth while the
&dquo;friend&dquo; was taking a mid-afternoon nap. The
inhumanity of this act was so threatening to the
other boys that the aggressor became the un-
disputed leader of the group. It became a major
task to demonstrate to the boys that they fol-
lowed out of fear rather than respect.
The Response to Threat
The most usual response to threat is the
experience of fear. Fear in turn stimulates
counter measures designed to remove the
threat and it is these counter measures that
produce warfare between boys or gangs.
The classic obverse case is that of the small
boy who rattles his saber, recounts his past
glories, calls the role of his allies, and de-
fines his growing might only to be greeted
by raucous laughter and amusement on the
part of the &dquo;victim&dquo; who is twice his size.
The hollow threat provokes no fear and no
retaliation. When faced squarely with a
meaningful threat the victim usually re-
sponds in kind. He threatens through a
series of &dquo;if&dquo; propositions. He threatens to
deprive (if you attack, I will withhold things
you want). He threatens to retaliate in kind
or he threatens a horrible but unspecified
fate for the attacker. This exchange of ulti-
matums is always halted by combat if one
of the two boys is certain of his capacity
to win. It is halted short of combat if
the ultimatums are face-saving and clearly
recognized as such by both the stronger and
the weaker parties. In any event, the
weaker party must be the first to cease
issuing ultimatums (thus tacitly admitting
defeat) if he wishes to avoid open hostility
of a physical sort.
Given the perception of threat by others,
aggressive boys indulge in all the familiar
national patterns of response (5). They
threaten massive retaliation, they engage
in brinkmanship, they openly discuss first
and second strike capabilities, they engage
in armament races, they recruit allies, and
they assume a succession of defensive pos-
tures in their search for security and free-
dom from fear. They tend regularly to
underestimate the capacity of the enemy
as they concentrate on what they will do
in retaliation for attack. They tend to stereo-
type the enemy and simplify his thought
processes in order to be able to plan easily
for defense. When the threat is directed
toward a group or gang, there are long argu-
ments about policy and defense with the
actual behavior at the time of open con-
flict being quite spontaneous, unthinking,
and not according to plan.
The most common first reaction to threat
is an unfortunate one-communication with
the enemy ceases. The immediate effect of
this withdrawal from direct contact with the
opponent is to render the determinants of
action as much a consequence of fantasy and
fear as of an appraisal of reality. Corrective
information about motives, tools, or plans
are left to speculation and the machinations
of fear and anxiety. Preparations for de-
fense are always misinterpreted by the an-
tagonist as preparation for attack and a
vicious circle is closed. The catalogue of
reactions to threat is a familiar one and need
not be detailed. It is at this point in the
interpersonal relations of children who hate
that mechanisms for the deterrence of ag-
gression become mandatory.
The Deterrence of Aggression
The attempt to head off disorder or to
restore peace is an unending process with
these children. Ideally, all our efforts should
be directed toward prevention and the con-
struction of a world in which there would be
285
no need for assault as a part of interpersonal
diplomacy. This, unfortunately, is not pos-
sible in a situation in which individuals have
been allowed to develop an aggressive style
of life and have had experiences which as-
sure the development of hatred toward the
world as it is. We must start, then, with
the fact of aggression as a way of life;
aggression that has proved a profitable de-
vice in the past or aggression that has been
the single alternative offered to the child in
his early life. A power-hungry potential
leader finds in aggression the path to his
aims.
The devices we use to control aggression
are mostly stop-gap in nature. They are
attempts to limit the expression of hostility
so that the long process of reorganizing the
individual and of providing him with alter-
natives for achievement other than war (4)
can be begun. The catalogue of deterrents
to be described is not rank-ordered in terms
of effectiveness since the usefulness of each
technique varies immensely with the spe-
cifics of each situation.
DISENGAGEMENT
This deterrent to aggression has the ad-
vantage of controlling the intensity of hostile
interchange and the flaw of severing com-
munication between the warring parties. We
make an attempt to prevent complete com-
munication loss by restricting contact only
when it is absolutely necessary. In many
instances we can find neutral zones of ac-
tivity in which the activity itself acts as a
cushion to the mutual aggression. Group
activities that do not require one-to-one con-
tact can, if properly supervised, absorb
much mutual antagonism. The purpose of
disengagement is to eliminate the possibility
of head-on encounter while encouraging
interaction that can have a positive out-
come. Transient aggressive outbursts that
are a consequence of passing frustrations
frequently dissolve in the midst of the sub-
stitute activity and then need no further
attention. If no better than neutrality is
achieved, each of the boys tends to store
up hostility for a later encounter. Disen-
gagement without constructive re-establish-
ment of communication between the warring
parties becomes nothing more than a tem-
porary stand-off and increases the tension
and perceived threat between them.
In order to disengage two combatants and yet
maintain communication between them, we ap-
point a neutral third party (a counselor) to act
as intermediary between them. In this fashion,
each boy is prevented from directly provoking
the other or responding directly to provocation
since direct contact of any sort is a violation of
the rules to which we have agreed. In order to
break the hostile deadlock, the counselor ar-
ranges a series of highly gratifying situations in
which they both can participate (ice-cream mak-
ing, special trips, etc.) without competing for the
gratification. Activities that work best are those
in which their independent contributions pro-
duce an otherwise unobtainable end product
which they can then mutually enjoy. Preparing
and cooking food for a cook-out is effective if
their individual hungers are not allowed to
become too intense.
a) Demilitarized Zones. When the level
of mutual hostility is extremely high, dis-
engagement must take a more drastic form
than the simple and general admonition to
stay away from one another. The stated
specification of situations and areas to be
avoided becomes necessary. The purpose
of the demilitarized zones goes beyond
reducing the possibility of open conflict. It
serves as an indication to the fighters of
the seriousness with which an aggressive
solution to their problems is viewed. Fre-
quently, the complexity of the arrangements
for disengagement and demilitarization of
certain zones impresses each child with his
own power (why else all the adult atten-
tion ?) and, in a sense, both get carried away
with admiration for their own &dquo;wanted&dquo;
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posters. It is an excellent face-saving device
for all concerned and it is greeted with a
sigh of relief by the combatants.
b) Secession. Failing all else, we some-
times allow small groups to secede from the
larger society for brief periods of time. This
is an extreme form of disengagement which
permits a gross reorganization of the indi-
vidual or group relationships free of the
stimulation to aggress provided by others.
Such a move must be a voluntary one and
communication about the meaning of the
secession and plans for eventual unity with
the larger society must be continuous. The
most usual outcome of such secession is that
of a growing awareness on the part of those
involved of their own contribution to their
difficulties. Secession is most effective when
blame for interpersonal difficulties is being
attributed solely to the actions of others.
Secession amounts to a process of elimina-
ting the supposed causes of the difficulty
in order to examine the individual’s behavior
free of stimulation and provocation. The
effectiveness of this device depends in great
part on the willingness of adults to allow
aggressive children to prey on one another
rather than the larger society. Humanity
dictates that such experiments be done with
caution since they regularly prove to be
painful to all concerned.
TREATIES AND TRUCES
Cease fire arrangements can be made
with some success either on an implicit or
explicit basis. As with most instances of
aggressive conflict, we can depend on the
existence of considerable fear in both boys.
The explosive and uncontrolled character of
open hostility is such that no one can really
be comfortable with it and it is this fear-
inspiring quality which brings our antag-
onists to the diplomatic table. The willing-
ness to negotiate is stimulated further by the
awareness of disapproval for aggressive be-
havior by the outside world. In any event,
the meanest and toughest of our clients has
always welcomed the opportunity to protest
his innocence and to accuse his opposite
number. We have discovered that any form
of treaty or truce has a limited future. They
tend to last only as long as it is to the mutual
interest of the parties to maintain them. The
moment of rupture is never fully predictable
since it is a function of any of a number of
situations which can act to light the fuse.
Continued communication, positive experi-
ences, and therapy focused on the reasons
for the mutual hostility are needed. With-
out these reasoned attempts at a solution of
the relationship, treaties and truces do no
more than provide time for the emotions to
fester and for both sides to prepare anew.
OCCUPATION TROOPS
In the most severe instances, disengage-
ment, demilitarization, or truce and treaty
are not sufficient deterrents. A stronger
third party is required to police the terms
of the agreement. These watch dogs need
to be vigilant in the early stages of their
task and be sensitive to the developing situa-
tion in order to pass control on to those
being policed. If vigilance continues beyond
the demands of the situation, the watch dogs
become the recipients of hostility issuing
from both sides. Efforts to anticipate diffi-
culties and to head off trouble are resented
since they take place at a point in time
where the consequences of a failure to
interfere are far from apparent. Such peace-
making is trying to the most expert of men.
Our use of occupation troops is usually on a
territorial basis; members of warring gangs are
not allowed to be in the cabin area without
adult supervision. This third party is always
resented as an inhibitor of the right to self-
determination and receives not only aggression
displaced from the true target but is hated for
what it represents as a symbol of parent-like
interference. In part, the resentment arises be-
287
cause the occupation troops are a constant re-
minder that the child is not considered capable
of managing his own affairs. This visible insult
to one’s maturity is a frustration that evokes
aggression which gets heightened every time a
dispute is settled in favor of the enemy.
INSPECTION
Occupation troops also act as inspectors
to assure that the terms of agreement are
being kept. Inspection is resented in the
extreme by innocent and guilty alike. In
instances when contraband is being sought
(cigarettes, knives, stolen property, etc.)
the victims of the act of inspection use the
act in an attempt to establish a basis for
emotional blackmail against the inspectors.
Cooperation tends to be sullen or coupled
with resentment and inspectors soon are
torn between their need to enforce the law
and an equally compelling need to establish
friendly and unsuspicious relations with
those being inspected. We have discovered
no way to make threat of inspection appear
to be other than what it is-an expression
of distrust of others. The more thorough the
inspector, the more hostility his acts en-
gender. In an effort to circumvent this
situation, we do not ask those who have
a good relationship with the child or who
must deal with him in other circumstances
to act as inspectors. We try to leave negotia-
tion and diplomacy for those who are neutral
or whose relationship is uncontaminated.
In addition to the psychological damage
which inspection seems to do, it happens
also to be fairly ineffective as a means of
controlling behavior or discovering contra-
band. Among boys with records of delin-
quency, the normal channels of intelligence
are as effective as, and if done properly,
free of the stigma and indignity of, inspec-
tion. If the participants agree to the inspec-
tion and cooperate with it, we can deduce
either that the inspected have decided to
match wits with us or that inspection is
unnecessary. The hostility generated by
inspection hardly makes it worth the effort.
SOCIAL ISOLATION
In the tradition of all blockades, social
isolation acts to deprive the aggressive child
of his victim. This is a last resort used only
for totally unmanageable children since it
is essentially a punitive act. Being deprived
of the society of his peers is an especially
painful event since the average child is
without the requisite skills for tolerating
aloneness. Isolation is usually entered into
with bravado by the child but this soon
passes into intense longing for companions.
We isolate the child from those with whom
he cannot relate peacefully but we do not
remove him completely from human contact.
There are advantages to positive contact
with other non-combatants and all the
child’s contacts are supervised by an under-
standing adult. The role of adult super-
vision is not that of police and prisoner, it
is rather that of a friend to a child in trouble.
All of the adult’s efforts are directed to un-
derstanding the source of the child’s con-
flict and to providing insight about it to
the child. In this manner, we again pursue
our policy of expanded rather than restricted
communication about the problem to be
solved. In our search for the sources of
irritation we need always to probe beneath
the surface of the distasteful behavior. To
the degree that we stereotype and over-
simplify, we fail at our task and hostility
breaks out anew.
Social isolation is used only for violent and
dangerous children. When a child is isolated
socially, he is removed from his cabin and while
he has access to all of the facilities of camp he
is never allowed to contact (or be in the vicinity
of) those toward whom he has hostile feelings.
Two conditions are imposed: (1) he must work
actively to solve his problem of relating to the
group, (2) he must make enough progress to
be able to return to his group within a three-day
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period. If we fail to succeed in this effort we
send the boy back to the detention home. In
essence, sending him home is the equivalent of
establishing a complete blockade so that we
no longer render him any service. With all the
resources at our command we find we are
forced, at times, to take such extreme steps.
An Appraisal of the 
’
Deterrence of Aggression
With all the skill and experience we have
accumulated in the management and deter-
rence of aggression, we must still report
cases that resist the best of our efforts.
Aggression with an admixture of psychosis
or aggression with deep roots may require
lengthy treatment without much hope for
success. When such children reach the age
when they are more able to instrument the
hostility they feel or when they rise to posi-
tions of power in a society, the problem of
curbing them is intensified incredibly. Their
hostility evokes an echo in the unexpressed
anger of those who follow them and the
cloak of rationality and righteousness soon
descends over their behavior.
The behavior of an aggressive individual
can be controlled, as we have demonstrated,
but only under special circumstances. In
our case, the aggressive child is relatively
powerless against adults experienced with
hostility in all of its forms and almost all of
our control issues from this relationship. The
older and more experienced the child, the
less effective are our controls and the more
we must rely on repressive measures.
Our observations of this microcosm of
aggression have taught us several things.
We have come to know of the intimate con-
nection between fear and aggression and
have learned never to deal with one without
the other. We have discovered that the
most usual error is that of underestimating
the fear component in aggressive acts. It is
most often for this reason that solutions to
aggression tend to fail. We have been
forced to face squarely the powder-keg-
and-lighted-match character of hostile per-
sons. Their emotions and their capacity to
aggress are ever-present dangers to peaceful
existence and form the basis for seemingly
trivial incidents that trigger great explosions.
The role of fear has its greatest impact
when communications are severed between
the hostile units. A rise in tension regularly
accompanies the failure to communicate
since the anchoring points in reality are
eliminated. Ignorance gives fear free reign
and elevates tension and the perception of
threat to the point that the reality of
capacity to attack becomes less vital than
the promise of freedom from tension.
Deterrence of aggression we have found
always to be a part solution and an unstable
one at best. Unless the basic causes of ag-
gression are remedied, deterrence can bring
only a false sense of security. Positive
deterrence in the form of need satisfaction
and acceptable alternative forms of be-
havior must be a necessary second step.
While it is apparent that man is unlikely
to discover a cure-all for his aggressive na-
ture, it is also true that the world is popu-
lated by persons for whom aggression is not
a problem. For nations of men this enviable
state of affairs is achieved when the stand-
ards of behavior they value are such as to
exclude aggression as a proper means of
solving problems. While we are able to ac-
complish this in individuals more often than
we fail at it, the process by which it is
achieved is not so clear that we can draw
up a set of fool-proof specifications for the
mass production of such persons. This is an
instance in which we cannot afford to fail
in the process of socialization as often as we
do. The nature of societies is such that the
exceptions often prove to be our undoing.
The task of socialization is an unending one
since each generation grows to confront us
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with exactly the same dilemma we have
faced since the beginning of time (2).
What is the relevance of this analogy of
the behavior of aggressive delinquents to
the war-like actions of nations? It suggests,
first, that a clearer understanding of the
nature of aggression among groups is very
much needed. Social scientists have access
to groups in which the evolution of aggres-
sion can be studied with an eye to gen-
eralizations that will have application to
international affairs. The contribution of
behavioral scientists has been minimal in
this area and, as a consequence, the aggres-
sive acts of nation-states have been re-
sponded to by policy-makers as if they were
unique and unpredictable. I submit that
the careful study of aggressive group inter-
action in microcosm will eventually provide
guide lines for the prediction of such events
and for the determination of the most profit-
able form of deterrent policy. Aggressive
interaction has about it a regularity which
suggests that an assessment of the kind,
quality, and degree of tension between na-
tions would allow a rank-ordering of pos-
sible counter-measures in terms of their
impact and probable effect. It seems logical
to suppose that if it can be done with de-
linquent gangs it can succeed with other in-
stitutionalized ways of expressing aggression.
This analogy has even greater application
to our understanding of the role of the
aggressive leader in determining conflict
between groups. It is, of course, much too
naive to attempt to account for national
conflict on the sole basis of the leader’s per-
sonality. Even the unquestioned leader of
a small delinquent gang is subject to influ-
ence by his followers and must think in
group as well as individual terms in planning
his actions. The size and complexity of his
following acts do force him to weigh his
decisions with increasing care but they do
not change the fundamental nature of his
personality. Thus, in times of crisis he is
liable to act seeking only the counsel of his
own impulses and he is liable, in general, to
surround himself with subordinates who
share his fundamentally aggressive orien-
tation to life. What society labels as delin-
quent leadership has about it certain char-
acteristics that must be acknowledged if we
are to predict the course of its actions and
it is in this respect that personal hostility
looms large in international relations.
In our democratic society we tend to see
leadership as a process in which a reluctant
citizen has power thrust upon him by an
enthusiastic electorate and we tend to view
with suspicion any avowed desire, on the
part of the candidate, to seek power for its
own sake. There is something of a charade
involved in ascending to power in America,
and other nations may find it difficult to
understand the discrepancy between the
fact of exercise of power and our percep-
tion of its proper use. Leaders of other
countries emerge from social conditions so
unlike our own that we err greatly in assess-
ing them and predicting their reactions from
the frame of reference of our own kind of
leadership. In this respect, the delinquent
leader and his unabashed quest for personal
power might be a better model for judging
the personality structure of leaders of other
cultures. In such leaders, power may not
corrupt in the classic sense of converting
good to evil; the use of power for personal
glory and aggrandizement is more likely to
have been the original motivation in his rise
to power and this may not seem as repre-
hensible to members of cultures other than
our own. Delinquent followers accept the
authority of the raw exercise of power and
respond to traditional democracy as evidence
of wavering leadership.
To press the analogy further, it would
seem reasonable to suppose that to the
degree that other societies resemble our own
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in values, beliefs, and conception of leader-
ship we might be justified in using our own
version of the characteristics of leaders as
a guide for prediction of behavior. To the
degree that leadership is a function of a
life-long self-image constructed on notions
of personal destiny, the mysticism of being
chosen to lead, and the identity of power
and leadership, we might more profitably
look to the model of the psychic life of the
delinquent as an appropriate guide. The
leader for whom the exercise of power is a
way of life may be, like delinquent leaders,
highly sensitive to the perception of threat
from other persons and ready to act violently
and to ignore counsel when his emotions are
sufficiently aroused. Rational considerations
of history, economics, military preparedness
or the opinion of others may thus have little
impact on the final decision-making process.
This analogy suggests that the concept of
&dquo;rational man&dquo; may have led us astray
by causing us to reject too glibly the
role of personal hostility and international
aggression.
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